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Abstract
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that
is useful for expressing security policies for data conﬁden-
tiality and integrity. However, extending noninterference to
concurrent programs has proved problematic. In this pa-
per we present a relatively expressive secure concurrent lan-
guage. This language, based on existing concurrent calculi,
provides ﬁrst-class channels, higher-order functions, and an
unbounded number of threads. Well-typed programs obey a
generalization of noninterference that ensures immunity to
internal timing attacks and to attacks that exploit informa-
tion about the thread scheduler. Elimination of these reﬁne-
ment attacks is possible because the enforced security prop-
erty extends noninterference with observational determin-
ism. Although the security property is strong, it also avoids
some of the restrictiveness imposed on previous security-
typed concurrent languages.
1 Introduction
Type systems for tracking information ﬂow within programs
are an attractive way to enforce security properties such as
data conﬁdentiality and integrity. Recent work has proposed
a number of security-typed languages whose type systems
statically check information ﬂow, ranging from simple cal-
culi [28, 45, 17, 1, 38, 49, 41, 19, 18] to full-featured lan-
guages [27, 50, 30, 4]. Many systems for which informa-
tion security is important are concurrent—for example, web
servers, databases, operating systems—yet the problem of
checking information ﬂow in concurrent programming lan-
guages has not yet received a satisfactory solution.
This research was supported in part by DARPA Contract F30602-99-1-
0533, monitored by USAF Rome Laboratory, by ONR Grant N00014-01-1-
0968, by NSF CAREER Award 0133302, by NSF Grant 0208642, and by
a Sloan Research Fellowship. The U.S. Government is authorized to repro-
duce and distribute reprints for Government purposes, notwithstanding any
copyright annotation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein
are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily repre-
senting the ofﬁcial policies or endorsement, either expressed or implied, of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force
Research Laboratory, or the U.S. Government.
This paper makes two contributions. First, it presents a
deﬁnition of information-ﬂow security that is appropriate for
concurrent systems. Second, it describes a simple but ex-
pressive concurrent language with a type system that prov-
ably enforces security.
Notions of secure information ﬂow are usually based on
noninterference [15], a property only deﬁned for determin-
istic systems. Intuitively, noninterference requires that the
publicly visible results of a computation do not depend on
conﬁdential (or secret) information. Generalizing noninter-
ference to concurrent languages is problematic because these
languages are naturally nondeterministic: the order of execu-
tion of concurrent threads is not speciﬁed by the language se-
mantics. Although this nondeterminism permits a variety of
thread scheduler implementations, it also leads to reﬁnement
attacks in which information is leaked through resolution of
nondeterministic choices (in this case, scheduler choices).
These attacks often exploit timing ﬂows, covert channels that
have long been considered difﬁcult to control [20].
Several recent papers have presented type systems for se-
cure information ﬂow in concurrent languages [43, 38, 41,
5, 19, 29, 36]. The type systems of these languages enforce
secure information ﬂow; but most of these type systems are
so restrictive that programming becomes impractical.
The secure concurrent language presented in this paper,
 
 

, addresses both of these limitations.   

has been
proved to enforce a generalization of noninterference for
concurrent systems, based on low-security observational de-
terminism. Much of the restrictiveness of prior security type
systems for concurrent languages arises from the desire to
control timing channels; we show that some restrictiveness
can be avoided by distinguishing different kinds of timing
channels. This approach opens up a trade-off between the
observational powers of an attacker and the restrictiveness
of the enforcement mechanism. In some situations, the more
restrictive model of the attacker may be warranted, but in
other cases, the less restrictive model is acceptable.
The concurrency features in most previous secure lan-
guages have been limited. By contrast,   

provides fairly
general support for concurrency: it allows an arbitrary num-
ber of threads, it supports both message-passing and shared-
1
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memory styles of programming, and communication chan-
nels are themselves ﬁrst-class values.   

is not intended
to serve as a user-level programming language (its syntax
and type system are too unwieldy). Instead, it is intended
to serve as a model language for studying information ﬂow
and concurrency; nevertheless, using these constructs, one
can encode (via CPS translation) other security-typed lan-
guages [49].
The approach taken here is to factor the information se-
curity analysis into two pieces: a type system that elimi-
nates both explicit and implicit storage channels, and a race-
freedom analysis that eliminates timing channels. Factoring
the security analysis makes both the information-ﬂow anal-
ysis and its proof of correctness more modular. In addition,
any improvements in the accuracy of alias analysis (used to
detect races) lead directly to improvements in the security
analysis. This paper focuses mainly on the type system for
explicit information ﬂows, but race freedom is discussed in
Section 4.3.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tions 2 and 3 present and argue for our deﬁnition of in-
formation security and also informally describes our con-
current programming model and its security implications.
Section 4 gives the formal deﬁnition of   

. Section 5
states our soundness results, including the security theorem.
(Full proofs are available in the dissertation of the ﬁrst au-
thor [48].) Section 6 covers related work, and the paper con-
cludes in Section 7.
2 Security model
Information security is fundamentally connected to the abil-
ity of an observer to distinguish different program execu-
tions. Our primary concern is conﬁdentiality. An attacker
must be prevented from distinguishing two program execu-
tions that differ only in their conﬁdential inputs, because the
attacker might otherwise learn something about the inputs.
As usual, we assume that there is a lattice   of security
labels [7, 11]. Lattice elements describe restrictions on the
propagation of the information they label; labels higher in
the lattice describe data whose use is more restricted. For
conﬁdentiality, labels higher in the lattice describe more con-
ﬁdential data whose dissemination should be restricted. In
this paper we will leave the lattice abstract; however, it is
often useful to think about the simple two-point lattice con-
taining just the elements   (low) and  (high), where    
but     
The terminology “

is protected by 

” is used to indicate
that 

 

—intuitively it is secure to treat data with label


as though it has label 

because the latter label imposes
more restrictions on how the data is used. The terms “high-
security” and “low-security” describe data whose labels are
relatively high or low in the lattice, respectively.
2.1 Noninterference and nondeterminism
Suppose that we have a low-equivalence relation 
 
that re-
lates two program expressions  and   if they differ only in
high-security input data. Here  (“zeta”) is a label that de-
ﬁnes “high-security”: high-security data is any whose label
 does not satisfy   . The low observer (attacker) can see
only data protected by .
For example, consider pairs  , where  ranges over
some high-security data and  ranges over low-security data.
An observer with low-security access (only permitted to see
the  component) can see that the pairs     
and 	 	   are different (because    ), but
will be unable to distinguish the pairs     
and 	 	   . We have:
     

	 	   
     

	 	  
Noninterference says that this equivalence relation also
captures the distinctions that can be made by observing the
execution of the two expressions; an observer able to see only
low-security data learns nothing about high-security inputs
by watching the program execute. Suppose we have an eval-
uation relation   . Evaluations of two expressions will be
indistinguishable as long as they produce indistinguishable
results: If  
 

 
, then
    
 
 
 
   
 

  (1)
Note that values  and   need not be strictly equal. The
equivalence relation 
 
on values captures the idea that the
low-security observer may be unable to see certain parts of
the program output—it relates any two values whose differ-
ences are not observable by the low observer.
This deﬁnition of security is appealing, although it does
permit high-security information to leak through termination
behavior. Because termination behavior communicates an
average of one bit of information in an information-theoretic
sense, we follow common practice by ignoring this covert
channel [8, 45, 17, 27].
This deﬁnition does not apply straightforwardly to con-
current languages. First, the idea that a program termi-
nates with a single result is less appropriate for a concurrent
language, where programs may produce observable effects
while continuing to run. This can be addressed by describ-
ing the observations about program execution as a ﬁnite or
inﬁnite event trace. Suppose that a machine conﬁguration
consists of a pair 	  where	 is the state of the memory
and  is the executing program. The statement  
 means
that the conﬁguration  may produce the execution trace

 . For the language deﬁned in this paper, the event trace
consists of the sequence of memory states 	

	

	

      
that occur as the program executes.
A second, more signiﬁcant difﬁculty with concurrent lan-
guages is nondeterminism; there may be many traces 
 such
that   
 . For example, the language presented below
has a nondeterministic operational semantics that allows any
2
Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’03) 
1063-6900/03 $17.00 © 2003 IEEE 
possible interleaving of the evaluations of two parallel pro-
cesses. Informally, there are two rules for evaluating an ex-
pression  
 
   

where the symbol   represents parallel com-
position:1
   
 
    
 
 
 
 

   
 
  

    
 
 
 
 
  


   

    
 
 
 


   
 
  

    
 
 
 
  
 


The thread scheduler resolves this nondeterminism by
choosing a thread to run at each execution step.
A standard way to handle nondeterminism is a possibilis-
tic generalization of noninterference in which the computa-
tions of two expressions are considered indistinguishable as
long as every possible computation of one expression is pos-
sible for the other expression as well [23]; that is,
 
 
 


must imply:

 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 




 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


(2)
If the evaluation relation is deterministic, this security
condition is noninterference. Importantly, it can be proved in
essentially the same way as noninterference. One common
technique is to show that each step of computation preserves
the low-level equivalence between conﬁgurations [15, 45].
However, a system that satisﬁes the possibilistic security
condition may have a reﬁnement that does not. As a result,
an observer may be able to distinguish two such programs
by comparing the probabilities of possible executions. For
example, consider this program:
       	
      (A)
Here the boolean variables  and  are low- and high-security
locations respectively. This program is secure if the low
observer cannot distinguish between the following two pro-
grams:
       	
      (A1)
       	
     	
 (A2)
Suppose that the low observer is unable to distinguish two
traces if their ﬁnal memories have the same values in loca-
tion . In both programs the location  may end with the
contents  or 	
, so the possible low observations of
the two programs are identical. However, an attacker may
be able to infer some information about the initial value of
. For example, the thread scheduler may tend to run the ﬁ-
nal expression of the three last, so that the second program
usually has the effect   . If the scheduler randomly
chooses ready threads to execute,  will be more likely to
contain  than . In general, if the distribution of the ﬁnal
values of  is different in the two programs, it is undoubtedly
because the assignment    is leaking information about
 via (perhaps probabilistic) reﬁnement of thread scheduler
nondeterminism.
Even the simple program        	

might be used to violate conﬁdentiality, despite not men-
tioning high-security data. For example, the code for the
1The actual operational semantics of  

is given in Figure 3.
assignment   	
 might happen to fall on the same
cache line as a piece of data used by another apparently se-
cure program running on the same system. If accesses to
this other data are conditioned on conﬁdential information,
it could make the assignment   	
 more likely to
come last, winning the write–write race. Thus, an attacker
might learn about conﬁdential data by introducing such pro-
grams into a running system. Attacks of this sort have been
demonstrated [42].
2.2 Internal vs. external timing
Many previous security-typed language approaches for con-
current programs [43, 41, 19, 5, 36] aim to prevent high-
security information from affecting the termination behavior
and timing behavior of a program. This decision strengthens
possibilistic noninterference by considering execution time
to be observable by the low-security observer. Conﬁdential
information thus cannot be encoded in the execution time of
one thread and then transferred to a second thread, as in the
following example that exploits thread timing behavior:
   (B)
	
   	  
   
  		    
This program initializes variable  to  and then spawns
two threads. The ﬁrst thread assigns  the value 	
 either
immediately or after a delay. The second thread waits long
enough that the assignment to  is likely to have occurred
when  is false; this thread then assigns  the value of .
Depending on the thread scheduler, this program can reliably
copy the contents of  into the variable —an information
leak. Its bandwidth can be increased by placing the code
inside a loop.
If program execution time is considered low-observable,
information ﬂow control requires that the execution time of
low-equivalent programs be equal. Because proving state-
ments about execution time is difﬁcult, the type systems pro-
posed to enforce this security condition have tended to be
very restrictive. For example, these type systems have usu-
ally ruled out programs like the following, because its run-
ning time depends on high-security information:
   (C)
   	 
 
   	

A related way to treat timing channels is to pad code to
eliminate them [3, 36], for example by ensuring that the same
time is taken by both branches of an . However, this ap-
proach does not easily handle loops, recursive functions, or
instruction-cache effects.
Here we have taken a different approach, drawing a dis-
tinction between the internally and externally observable
timing behavior of programs. External observations are
those made by an observer outside the system, timing the
program with mechanisms external to the computing sys-
tem. Internal observations are those made by other programs
3
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running on the same system. In principle, internal observa-
tions are more easily controlled because other programs can
be subjected to a validation process before being allowed to
run. Typically, internal observations also offer greater po-
tential for high-bandwidth information transfer, so they may
also be more important to control. In this work, the focus is
on controlling information ﬂows that are internal to the sys-
tem. Because there are many external ﬂows, most of which
are difﬁcult to control (e.g., conversation between users of
the system), and other techniques that can be applied to con-
trolling them (e.g., auditing, dynamically padding total exe-
cution time), this decision seems reasonable.
The beneﬁcial effect of this decision is that example (C) is
considered secure because its timing channels are only exter-
nal; example (B) is considered insecure because it contains
an internal timing channel made observable by a race.
2.3 Low-security observational determinism
The weaknesses of possibilistic security conditions (e.g., (2))
led McLean [24] and Roscoe [32] to propose that noninter-
ference be generalized to nondeterministic systems as low-
security observational determinism. Low-security observa-
tional determinism is essentially noninterference as given
above (1), but applied to a nondeterministic system. In our
framework the observational determinism can be expressed
straightforwardly. Similarly to noninterference, we have two
arbitrary initial conﬁgurations   and    that the low ob-
server cannot distinguish (   
 
 
 ). To avoid information
ﬂows, they must produce indistinguishable traces  and   :
      
 
 
 
   
 

  (3)
Thus, to a low-level observer who is unable to distinguish
states that differ only in high-security components, a system
satisfying this condition appears deterministic.
2.4 Race freedom
To obtain deterministic results from the low-security view-
point, it is not necessary that evaluation itself be determinis-
tic, which is fortunate because nondeterminism is important.
Nondeterministic evaluation allows thread scheduler behav-
ior to depend on aspects of the run-time system not under
the programmer’s control: for instance, the operating sys-
tem, the available resources, or the presence of other threads.
The problem is how to permit useful nondeterminism with-
out creating security holes.
Our insight is that requiring race freedom is a solution
to this problem. To be considered secure, a program must
enforce an ordering on any two accesses to the same memory
location, when at least one of the accesses is a write. This
ordering ensures that the sequence of operations performed
at a single memory location is deterministic.
Race freedom rules out insecure programs like example
(A) because it has a write–write race to the location  . How-
ever, the program  
 
    

 	 is consid-
ered secure because it writes to two different locations, even
though the ordering of these writes is nondeterministic. Dis-
allowing races reduces the expressiveness of the language,
but because races are difﬁcult to reason about, programmers
rarely use them intentionally; races are usually bugs.
Making programs race-free weakens the ability of a
thread to observe the behavior of other threads. The observa-
tional powers of the low observer are weakened correspond-
ingly. This weakening is expressed formally in the relation
  
 

  that captures when the low observer is able to dis-
tinguish two traces. Two traces  and    are related if they
are equivalent up to stuttering and preﬁxing at every memory
location, considered independently of other locations.
To be more precise, let  , a memory, be a ﬁnite map
from locations  to values . Then   is the contents of
location . Let    be the projection of the trace  onto a
single memory location ; that is, if   


 


   
then     

 
 
 

    . A sequence of
values 

 
 
 

    is related to another sequence of val-
ues  

 
 
 
 
 

    if 
 
 


 
 
for all  up to the length of the
shorter sequence. Then   


  if for all locations ,   
is equivalent up to stuttering to    , or vice versa.
Combining this deﬁnition of trace equivalencewith obser-
vational determinism (3) yields a new security condition that
allows high-security information to affect the external termi-
nation and timing behavior of a program, while preventing
any effect on internal termination and timing behavior.
Two aspects of this deﬁnition merit discussion. First, al-
lowing one sequence to be a preﬁx of the other permits an
external nontermination channel that leaks one bit of infor-
mation, but removes the obligation to prove program ter-
mination. However, this decision implies that the  

re-
lation on traces is not an equivalence relation (transitivity
fails). To see why, consider the three traces 
 
 

 
 
,


 

 
 
 

, 

 

 
 
 

, we have 

 


 
and

 
 



but 

 



. Consequently, we prove the secu-
rity property in terms of a more primitive simulation relation
 

(deﬁned in Section 5.3) that is transitive.
Second, considering each memory location independently
is justiﬁed because internal observations of the two locations
can only observe the relative ordering of their updates by
using code that contains a race—and programs containing
races are disallowed. By requiring only per-location order-
ing of memory operations, this deﬁnition avoids the restric-
tiveness incurred by timing-sensitive deﬁnitions of security.
3 Synchronization mechanisms
The previous section presents a new security condition for
concurrent imperative programming languages. A concur-
rent language can be made more expressive by exploiting the
added ﬂexibility in the condition. This section and the next
present such a language, called 
	
.
The race freedom requirement of the security deﬁnition
implies that threads cannot asynchronously communicate
through shared memory. Consequently, 
	
uses message
passing for interthread communication, and the communica-
4
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tion is regulated to prevent illegal information ﬂows. Also,
because the security deﬁnition relies on sequencing writes
to memory,   

needs a thread synchronization mecha-
nism. Despite its importance for practical concurrent pro-
gramming and impact on information-ﬂow properties, syn-
chronization has only recently been studied in the context of
information security [19, 30, 18].   

provides a thread-
synchronization mechanism based on the same abstraction it
uses for message passing.
3.1 Message passing
To support both thread synchronization and communication,
 
 

uses message passing. The programming model of
 
 

is based on the join calculus [13], which supports ﬁrst-
class channels;   

extends it with linear channels and
linear handlers. This linear synchronizationmechanism pro-
vides additional structure that allows the type system to more
accurately describe synchronization information ﬂows.
The   

notation for sending a value   on a channel   is
  . Messages may contain no data, in which case the send
is written  , or they may contain multiple values, in which
case the send is written   

 
 
. A send on a channel
may cause the activation of a correspondingmessage handler
(or simply handler), for example:       
When a message is sent on channel  , the handler triggers,
creating a new thread to execute    with the message
contents bound to the variable . The message is consumed
by the handler. Handlers may invoke their own channel, al-
lowing encoding of loops and recursive functions.
Handler deﬁnitions are introduced via 	-syntax. For
example, a  

program described above is:
	        
  	
Multiple threads might attempt to send messages on a sin-
gle channel concurrently, creating send contention and pos-
sibly race conditions. Lexical scoping of channel names
makes it impossible to introduce receive contention, in which
multiple handlers vie for a message.
In  

channels are ﬁrst-class and may be passed as val-
ues in the messages sent on other channels. For example, the
channel  sends two (empty) messages on any channel
it is given as an argument:
	          

	     
 
Ordinary handlers remain permanently in the program en-
vironment once declared, and are able to react to any number
of messages sent on the channels they deﬁne.  

also sup-
ports linear channels, on which exactly one message must be
sent. The symbol  is used in place of   to indicate that a
message handler is linear. For example, the following pro-
gram declares a linear channel  that must be used exactly
once along each execution path, as shown in this example:
	       


  	 	  
Linear handlers are guaranteed to be invoked exactly once
unless the computation diverges. Consequently, no informa-
tion is transmitted by the fact that the linear handler is run.
Furthermore, linear handlers cannot create nondeterminism
because there is never any send contention. These observa-
tions enable more precise information-ﬂow checking.
Channel arguments are given a security label that restricts
what data may be sent on them. This suggests an alternate
formulation of the security condition of Section 2.3: a pro-
gram could be equipped with a distinguished output channel
that accepts only low values, and we could require that the
sequence of values sent on the output channel is determinis-
tic. A distinguished input channel would also be required to
allow the program context to acknowledge the output. The
difference between the two approaches is not large, because
memory locations can be viewed as external processes that
receive messages at every write.
3.2 Synchronization
So far,  

has not addressed the issue of synchronization
between concurrent threads. Rather than directly incorpo-
rating mutexes or semaphores as primitives, we adopt join
patterns as found in the join calculus [13]. With this design,
handlers may block waiting for messages on multiple chan-
nels, permitting synchronization on several threads of execu-
tion. For example, the following handler waits for messages
on channels 
	

and 
	

before starting the thread
“	 ”.
 
 
    

   	 
        

If some of the channels in the join pattern never receive a
message, the handler never triggers.
This approach simpliﬁes reasoning about synchroniza-
tion. Unlike mutexes or semaphores, which may be used
anywhere within a program, join patterns limit synchroniza-
tion to points at which messages are received.
Despite this abstraction2, join patterns support a range
of useful synchronization idioms [13]. In particular, they
provide synchronous message passing between two threads.
Suppose thread 

wants to send the message  syn-
chronously on the channel  to thread

, after which it con-
tinues as 

. Thread 

blocks waiting for the message 
and then continues as thread 

 . In traditional message-
passing notation, this situation might be expressed by the fol-
lowing program:
	  
 
	
 



 
	
 
 

   	
Writing 



for sequential composition of (sequential)
processes 

and 

, this example can be written using

 

’s join patterns:
	 

   

   

 

 

 



  

 


2Join patterns could be implemented using mutexes or semaphores.
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  
 
  

     
  

  

   	 
 
 
	 

	 

	 

  

	 

  

	 


 
 
  
 



 

  
 



 
 
 



  
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 

Figure 1. Nonnested synchronization


	
also allows join patterns for linear channels. For
example, the program below declares a handler for two linear
channels 
 
and 

:
  
 
  

     
Channels 
 
and 

must be used exactly once in each pos-
sible execution path of the process.
Join patterns in 
	
permit complex synchronization
behavior. For instance, the program shown in Figure 1 has
the synchronization structure pictured there, where wavy ar-
rows represent computation and straight arrows represent
process forking or synchronizing message sends. The exam-
ple is a single-message producer-consumer pair. Note that
this program uses channel 
 inside the body of the handler
deﬁning channels  and .
The typical synchronization mechanisms for shared-
memory programming are locks, such as mutexes and
semaphores. Like other process calculi [26, 13], 
	
does
not directly support these mechanisms. Though their addi-
tion would be straightforward, locks do not interact with in-
formation ﬂow analysis as congenially as message-passing
does. Locks are primarily used to obtain atomicity, which
is useful for writing correct programs, but it provides little
help in reasoning about timing ﬂows. For example, given a
critical section controlled by a mutex, the order of arrival of
two threads can leak as much information as if there were no
mutex. Locks can be used as limited message-passing mech-
anisms, and it is plausible that a precise information ﬂow
analysis could be constructed for those uses.
3.3 Expressiveness
Security-typed languages rule out apparently insecure pro-
grams and thus may reduce expressiveness. While 
	
has
a relatively rich collection of features in comparison with the
previous work, it is difﬁcult to directly compare expressive-
ness because of the differing deﬁnitions of security.
Channels in 
	
are quite expressive. A channel is an
extension to a continuation: both accept a value and cause
some computation to occur, possibly using the value. 
	
is in fact an extension of a secure CPS language introduced
in the authors’ earlier work [49]. Thus adding concurrency
causes no loss of expressiveness, unlike in various previ-
ous secure concurrent languages that have ruled out high-
security loop guards [38, 36]. However, 
	
does rule out
programs that other systems consider secure [17, 38, 19, 36],
because those programs allow reﬁnement attacks. It is our
belief that these different approaches embody a tradeoff in
secure systems design. In cases where absolute security is
mandatory, the more restrictive languages may be required.
However, there are many circumstances in which external
timing and termination channels are acceptable risks.
Linearity is an important feature because it improves rea-
soning about implicit ﬂows: information ﬂows arising from
program control structure [8]. In the producer-consumer ex-
ample of Figure 1, knowing that the code at   is executed
gives no more information than knowing that  was exe-
cuted. Linearity makes it possible to determine this despite
the complex control structure. Prior secure concurrent lan-
guages are either unable to express this program or reject
it as insecure, which is unfortunate because the producer-
consumer idiom is useful.
4   

: A secure concurrent calculus
This section introduces the formal semantics for 
	
, in-
cluding its syntax, operational semantics, and type system.
4.1 Syntax and operational semantics
Figure 2 shows the syntax for 
	
programs. Base val-
ues in 
	
are channel names , memory locations , or
booleans  and . The metavariable 	 ranges over channels
and variables that have channel or linear channel type. A
process (“thread” and “process” are used interchangeably)
 consists of a sequence of  -declarations and primitive
operations followed by either the terminal process 
, an 
expression, or 

 

. Message sends and handlers are
as described in the previous section. Nonlinear join patterns
may bind linear variables 
 (although they are not required
to), but linear join patterns never bind linear variables. This
restriction prevents problems in sequencing linear sends.
It is helpful to deﬁne a sequential subset of 
	
: pro-
cesses not containing the  symbol. If  
 is a sequential
process that contains one free linear channel variable 
, the
process 	  is sugar for   
      
.
Figure 2 also describes a program’s dynamic state. A
memory  contains channel handler deﬁnitions in addition
to ordinary mappings between locations and their values; its
domain is generalized to include the join patterns  deﬁnes.
The function 	
 is the set of locations  and join pat-
terns  that appear in  . If   	
 then we write
 for the value  such that      . Similarly,
if   	
, we write  for the (open) process 
such that        . A synchronization environment 
stores the linear handlers that have been declared by the pro-
gram, using similar notation. Program-counter labels ( )
are used to track implicit information ﬂows [49, 30]. The
syntax      associates a top-level process  with a  
label. A collection of such processes running concurrently is
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      Variable names
     Channel value
  Reference value
     Boolean values
      Variables
 
 
Secure values
       Linear values
	
     Values
    Boolean operations
  Dereference
          Variables or channels
       Nonlinear channel
   Linear channel
    Join pattern
         	
   Primitive operation
      	    Reference creation
 
        Assignment
         Handler deﬁnition
         Linear handler deﬁnition
  
 
 Message send
  Linear message send
      
  Conditional
     Parallel processes
  Inert process
        Memory location  storing 
           Message handler
 
             Linear handler
 
              Process pool
     Machine conﬁguration

 
	 
 
 
 
   
 





 
 

     

   
     
Figure 2. Process syntax & notation
       	  
  
       	  
    
 
 

 
 
 


   
 
	  
    prim  
             prim  
         
 
             	    
            


 
where    	

        
  
 
     
     	  	           
where    	

          
 
  


 


       	    


         
 
  


 


       	    


          

 

     

 

  

 


      

 

     

 

  








 
      









where the 

are fresh
          

 

   

 

  

 


      

 

   

 

  


      







where the 

are fresh
     

 

 
 

   

 

 
 

    
 

 

  
 
 


 
 


      

 

 
 

   

 

 
 

    
     


	  

 







 

  

 

	 

     

 

   

 

     

 

 




         


	  

 


          
                
Figure 3.   

operational semantics
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called a process pool. A machine conﬁguration  is a triple
   , where  is a memory,  is a synchronization
environment, and  is a process pool.
Figure 3 contains the operational semantics for  

,
instrumented to track information ﬂow within executing
programs—that this instrumentation is correct is the purpose
of the security proof. The rules deﬁne a transition relation
 

  

between machine conﬁgurations, though space
limitations preclude full explanation of the semantics. Eval-
uation of primitive operations is described by a large-step
evaluation relation     prim  .
The evaluation rule for a process about to do a memory
update      
 
      updates the contents of
memory location  to contain a security value  whose label
is bounded below by 	, the security label of the reference
itself (needed to prevent information leaks through aliasing)
and   (needed to prevent implicit information ﬂows).
The two rules for evaluating conditional expressions show
how the program counter label approximates the implicit in-
formation ﬂows that arise due to program control behavior.
The process     

 
 

  

 evolves to the
process    	  

, where the new program counter label
is the join of the old one and the label of the value that regu-
lates the conditional—any assignment operations that occur
in 

will propagate the label   	 and so track the implicit
information introduced by the branch.
Note that the rules for evaluating handler deﬁnitions in-
stall their handlers in the appropriate environment, with the
channels renamed to prevent collisions; linear handlers also
record the   at the point of their deﬁnition. Correspond-
ingly, the rules for sending messages look up the channel in
the appropriate environment and start a thread to execute the
body. The rule for the new   differs between linear and
nonlinear messages; in the linear case the   of the sending
context(s) is discarded and the   existing at the evaluation
of the handler is used instead—possibly lowering  . Linear-
ity ensures that this is safe [49]: once the handler has been
reached, it must also be invoked (unless that thread of con-
trol does not terminate). Therefore, the future computation
learns nothing from its invocation.
The operational semantics in the ﬁgure are too rigid: they
require the right-most processes to take part in the computa-
tional step. Because thread scheduling should ignore the syn-
tactic ordering of process pools and processes running con-
currently, we introduce structural equivalences on processes
and process pools, allowing arbitrary reordering of items
separated by , and discarding of halted processes (	). These
structural equivalences (

 

, 

 

) are the least
symmetric, transitive congruences allowing these transfor-
mations. Finally, two machine conﬁgurations  

 

 


and  

 

 

 are structurally equivalent if they are -
equivalent and

 

.
The syntax-independent operational semantics is given by
the transition relation   deﬁned from the  relation by
       Security labels
    
 
Security types
      Booleans
    
 
 Channel types
   Reference types
     Linear channel types
              Type contexts
     Empty memory type
      Location type
   	   Channel deﬁnition type

      
     Linear type contexts
        	   Synchronization state types

 

 
 
Figure 4. Type syntax
composition with structural equivalence:
 

   

 	 
 

 
 

  

  
 

  
 

  

4.2   

type system
The language  

has a nonstandard type system that en-
forces the security condition. Figure 4 shows the types for

 

programs. They are divided into security types and lin-
ear types. Base types, 
, consist of booleans, channel types,
and references; security types 

 
are pairs consisting of a base
type and a security label annotation.
The channel type     has any number of nonlin-
ear arguments and at most one linear argument. The  
component of a channel type is a lower bound on the secu-
rity level of memory locations that might be written to if a
message is sent on this channel.
The linear types are channels  that accept nonlinear
arguments. A linear message does not itself reveal informa-
tion about the sending context (although its contents might),
so linear channel types do not need a   component.
The security lattice is lifted to a subtyping relation 
 on

 

types, in the usual manner [45, 49]. In particular, non-
linear channel types are contravariant in both their  -label
and their argument types; reference types are invariant.
A type context   is a ﬁnite map from nonlinear vari-
ables to their types. Linear type contexts  are ﬁnite maps
from linear variables to linear types. A memory type, 
(for heap), is a mapping from locations and channels to their
types. A synchronization state type  similarly maps linear
channels to their linear types.
The typing judgments are deﬁned by the rules in Fig-
ure 5. These judgments make use of auxiliary judgments
8
Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’03) 
1063-6900/03 $17.00 © 2003 IEEE 
that ensure values, linear values, and primitive operations are
well-typed (Figure 6). For space reasons we have omitted
the straightforward judgments for deciding that memories,
synchronization environments, and process pools are well-
formed, as well as the subtyping and subsumption rules.
The type system guarantees the following properties:
  Explicit and implicit insecure information ﬂows are
ruled out, if the program is also race-free.
  Channel names introduced by a linear handler are used
exactly once in each possible future execution path.
Typing judgments have the form              ,
which asserts that process  is well-typed in the context
deﬁned by   ,   ,  , , and a program-counter label  .
Nonlinear contexts   permit weakening and contraction,
whereas linear contexts  do not; thus, a process typed as-
suming a set of linear message handlers must use all of them.
The type system uses the   label to bound what can be
learned by seeing that the program execution has reached  .
The   component of the judgment is thus a lower bound
on the label of memory locations that may be written by  .
The rule that increases   is IF, because branching transfers
information to the program counter.
Most of the typing rules are similar in spirit to those in
recent security-typed languages [17, 49, 30], though there
are a few rules of special interest.
Concurrent processes 
 
  

are checked using the
program-counter label of the parent process, as shown in rule
PAR of Figure 5. The two processes have access to the same
nonlinear resources, but the linear resources must be parti-
tioned between them.
The typing rules LET and LETLIN make use of aux-
iliary operations that extract variable binding information
from handler deﬁnitions. A join pattern  yields a collec-
tion  
 
of channels it deﬁnes and a set of variables bound in
the body of the handler deﬁnition  

. For nonlinear join
patterns, the linear variables form a synchronization context
. The operation   
 
 
 
   

  , deﬁned in Fig-
ure 7 collects these channel names and variables for nonlin-
ear join patterns and assigns them types. A similar operation
      

 deﬁned for linear join patterns extracts
the synchronization point  and the context for the handler
body,  

.
Rule LET checks the body of the handler under the as-
sumption that the arguments bound by the join pattern have
the appropriate types. Nonlinear handlers cannot capture
free linear values or channels, because that would poten-
tially violate their linearity. Consequently, the only linear
resources available inside the body 
 
are those explicitly
passed to the handler: 

. Note that the channels deﬁned
by the nonlinear handler ( 
 
) are available inside the handler
body, which allows recursion. The process 

has access
to the newly deﬁned channels (in  
 
) and to the previously
PRIM
          
         	     

       	           

REF
            
       
 
   	     

       	           

ASSN
         
 
       	     

      
 
       
       	        
 
 

IF
          		 
 
       	       

 
   
       	       
 

 
  


ZERO              
PAR
     
 
 	
 
    

 
   
     
 
 

 	
 
 	

    

 
 


LET
  
 
 

   

  	


     

 

   	

    

 
     

 	     


       	         

 
 


LETLIN
   	

   


     

 
 
 	
 
    

 
     

 	

 	

    


     
 
 

 	
 
 	

         

 
 


SEND
         
 
 
 


        
 
 
 
  	   
 
 
 
      
 
        	      
 

LINSEND
  	     
        
 
 
 
       	     
Figure 5. Process typing
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Figure 7. Join pattern bindings
available resources. Rule LETLIN operates similarly but ex-
ternal linear channels may be used in the handler body.3
The rule for type-checking sends on nonlinear channels
requires that the channel type and the types of the values
passed in the message agree. Also, the program counter at
the point of the send must be protected by the label of the
message handler, which rules out implicit information ﬂows.
Sending a message on a linear channel does not impose
any constraints on the   label at the point of the send, be-
cause there is no information revealed by the act of sending
3Unlike the related linear-continuation type system [49], the type system
presented in Figure 5 does not explicitly enforce any ordering constraints on
the use of linear channels, relying instead on race freedom. Race freedom
implies that there is a causal relationship between the linear synchronization
handlers such that any two handlers that interfere are totally ordered. Inter-
fering linear handlers are used sequentially, so updates to memory locations
mentioned in the handlers are deterministic.
on a linear channel. Note that the contents of the messages
are labeled with the   label, because the linear message
might contain information about the program counter.
4.3 Race prevention and alias analysis
As discussed above, two concurrently running threads might
leak conﬁdential information if they have write–write or
read–write races. Rather than further complicating the type
system with race-condition analysis, we assume that a sep-
arate program analysis rejects programs that contain such
races. This strategy modularizes the proof of security: Any
program analysis that soundly guarantees race freedom can
be used in conjunction with this type system.
The remainder of this section formalizes our race freedom
condition and sketches some ways that existing technology
can be used to determine whether a given program satisﬁes
the condition.
Intuitively, the deﬁnition of race freedom requires that
steps performed by parallel threads can be interleaved in any
order. Formally, a conﬁguration   is race-free whenever
   
 
 
 and      

and      

and  

   

imply that there exists an   such that  

   
 and
 

   

. An open term is race-free whenever its closed
instances are race-free.
This is a strong notion of race freedom (it implies con-
ﬂuence), though certainly sufﬁcient to rule out timing leaks
that may occur between threads. It is possible to weaken the
deﬁnition of race freedom to consider harmful only nonde-
terminism apparent from the memory, but even with a weak-
ened deﬁnition of race freedom, nondeterminism on nonlin-
ear channels can cause races.
There are a number of ways to establish race freedom.
One approach is to use an alias analysis to soundly approx-
imate the set of locations and channels written to (or sent
messages) by a thread  . Call this set   . By de-
termining which locations are potentially read by  (a set
  ), an analysis can prevent races by requiring the fol-
lowing (and its symmetric counterpart) for any subprograms


and 

that might execute concurrently:
 

    

   

  
An alias analysis constructs ﬁnite models of the dynamic
behavior of a program in order to approximate which refer-
ences are instantiated with which memory locations at run
time. The more closely the abstract model agrees with the
true behavior of the system, the more accurate aliasing in-
formation can be. Formulating such an alias analysis is or-
thogonal to this work; instead, we have simply stated the
race-freedom property the analysis must enforce.
One trivially sound analysis is to assume that any process
might read or write any reference. Such a rough approxima-
tion to the actual aliasing forces the program to be sequen-
tial. A second possibility is to ensure that references and
nonlinear channels are used sequentially. Simple syntactic
constraints can enforce this property [31]. Sequentiality can
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also be formulated in the type system [19], but doing so is
rather complex.
Another possibility is to track aliasing directly in the type
system [40, 46], which would potentially permit very ﬁne-
grained control of concurrency. More generally, pointer
or shape analysis can be used to approximate     and
    [21, 9, 10, 33]. Because   

’s sequential core is
essentially an imperative language with  , we expect that
these existing alias analyses can be adapted to this setting.
5 Security condition
We now present more formally the security condition that
the   

language enforces and give an outline of the proof
techniques used.
Well-typed   

programs satisfy the determinism-based
security condition described informally in Sections 2.3 and
2.4. The proof strategy is to show that regardless of the high-
security inputs to a program, its low-security memory access
behavior can be simulated by a single, deterministic program
that differs only in its high-security parts. The existence of
a common simulation implies that low-security behavior re-
veals nothing about the inputs.
The remainder of this section sketches the proof that the
type system in conjunction with a race-freedom analysis
implies the security condition. A complete proof is avail-
able [48].
5.1 Subject reduction
Subject reduction is a crucial ﬁrst step of the security
proof because it establishes that evaluation preserves well-
formedness.
Lemma 5.1 (Subject reduction) Suppose that
       and            
Then there exist    and    such that              .
Furthermore,     extends   , and  and    agree on the
channels in their intersection.
Proof: The proof is by cases on the evaluation step used.
A number of additional lemmas are needed:
 Substitution: the usual lemmas for type preservation
when substituting for linear and nonlinear variables;
 Weakening: preservation of typing judgments when
program counter labels are lowered or heap types and
synchronization environments are extended.  
5.2 Observational equivalence
The -equivalence relation indicates when two values look
the same to a low-level observer.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (-equivalence) Let -equivalence (written

 
) be the family of symmetric binary relations inductively
deﬁned as follows.
 For values:
     


 


 
 

     
 
 

	  	 
   

 


 For linear values:
  







     

 
   	 


 


5.3 Process simulation
Generalizing -equivalence to processes is more involved
because there can be both high-security and low-security
computations running simultaneously, making it harder to
relate corresponding parts of subprograms. Bisimulation-
based proof techniques for noninterference are no longer ap-
propriate. Rather than giving a deﬁnition of 

for traces
directly, we instead give a simulation relation  

. Two pro-
grams are then -equivalent if they can both be simulated by
the same program.
The simulation relation is induced by the typing structure
of a source machine conﬁguration. Intuitively, if   


 
then conﬁguration  can simulate the low-security behavior
of  while ignoring both the timing and termination behav-
ior of the high-security computation in .
Deﬁnition 5.2 (-simulation) Let 

be the relation (mutu-
ally) inductively deﬁned as shown in Figures 8, 9, 10, 11 and
in the rules below.
For conﬁgurations: SIM-CONFIG
  

 



  

 

 

 



 

   

   

 



  

 

 

 

 

  



 

 


For processes with  
 : SIM-HIGH-PROC
 
    

 
 
 
      
 
 
 
           


 


 

 

For processes that are well-typed with  
 , the  

relationship acts homomorphically on the typing rule of the
term, replacing the judgment         with the equiva-
lence rule      





  (and similarly for primitive
operations). For example, the simulation for conditionals is
derived from the typing rule IF:
 
 
      

 



 

         	  
 
 


 
   
         	 


 

 

 

	 


 

 

The most important part of the  

relation is
SIM-HIGH-PROC. This rule says that any process that is
well typed with a  label not protected by  can be sim-
ulated by the process that just sends a response on each of
the linear channels. Intuitively, this simulation bypasses all
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of the potential high-security computation performed in  
and simply returns via the linear-channel invocations. Im-
portantly, for high-security process    
 
 
  the simulation
 
  always terminates, even if   does not; the simulation ig-
nores the termination behavior of   .
Observe that any value returned from a high-security con-
text via linear channels must itself be high-security, because
its label must protect that context’s program-counter label.
Therefore, it does not matter what value is returned in the
-simulation because that value is not observable anyway.
Also note that if there are no linear channels in the con-
text, the rule SIM-HIGH-PROC says that    
 
 —the high-
security process   has no way of affecting low-security
memory locations, so from the low-security view,   may as
well not exist.
In this setting the  
 
relation is more fundamental and
easier to work with than  
 
, because 
 
is not transitive and
hence not an equivalence relation. Two machine conﬁgura-
tions are -equivalent if they are both simulated by the same
conﬁguration:
Deﬁnition 5.3 (-equivalence for conﬁgurations)
Conﬁgurations 
 
and 

are -equivalent, written
    
 
 
 


, if and only if there exists a conﬁgura-
tion such that    
 
 
 
 and    

 
 
.
To prove that 

satisﬁes the security condition, we
ﬁrst show that the simulation preserves typing and respects
the operational semantics.
Lemma 5.2 (Simulation preserves typing) If     
and      
 

  then     .
Proof: By induction on the derivation of     ; the
inductive hypothesis must be extended to the other judgment
forms. The one interesting case is SIM-HIGH-PROC, which
holds because each free linear channel 
 
mentioned in   is
used exactly once in the simulation 
 

 

 
.  
Now we establish that the simulation respects the opera-
tional semantics.
Lemma 5.3 (-simulation) If     
 
 



and

 
 
 
 
then either  
 
 



or there exists   ,   ,
and 

such that

 
 

and  	      
 
 


 

.
Proof: This is proved by separately considering low-
security and high-security evaluation steps (    and
   , respectively). In either case it is shown that a step
of 
 
can be simulated by zero or one steps performed by
its simulation

. The proofs are by cases on the evaluation
step taken by
 
. A similar -simulation result follows.
 
Next, we show that the race-freedom condition im-
plies deterministic updates. Given a conﬁguration  

		, we deﬁne as 
.
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Figure 8. Primitive operation simulation
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Figure 9. Memory simulation
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Figure 10. Synchronization environment sim-
ulation
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Figure 11. Process pool simulation
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Lemma 5.4 (Race freedom and determinism) Suppose
that both  
  
 
 
 
  
and  
  
 
 
 
  
where
the last step of each evaluation sequence makes a low-
observable change to location , but no prior step does.
Then  
  
   

 
  
 .
Proof: By induction on   , applying a collection of re-
lated lemmas that use race freedom to reason about equiva-
lence of conﬁgurations after single syntax-independent eval-
uation steps.  
To talk about programs that differ only in high-security
inputs, we use substitutions. A substitution  is a ﬁnite map
from variables to values. If   is a typing environment and
 is a substitution, we write     to mean that  assigns
each variable a value of the type required by . The notation
  is short-hand for simultaneous capture-avoiding substi-
tutions. We write  

 



   if the two substitutions
satisfy   and map each variable to equivalent values given
heap type  .
The following lemma says that starting from a conﬁgura-
tion with an open process pool and closing it under equiva-
lent substitutions yields equivalent conﬁgurations.
Lemma 5.5 (Simulations and high-substitution)
Suppose the following hold:
     	

 	

 
	

    	

   
   

 



  
   	
            
Then for any conﬁguration ,
 	   
 

 	  

  implies
 	   
 

 	  

 
Proof: An easy induction on the typing derivation for pro-
cess pool  . The inductive cases follow from the construc-
tion of  

.  
5.4 Determinism-based security
Given the technical machinery above, we can state the secu-
rity theorem as follows.
Theorem 5.1 (Determinism-based security) Let  be an
arbitrary label in the security lattice. Suppose that
      
Let an initial memory  be given such that    and
suppose that whenever      	  

  the simula-
tion  is race-free. Let location   	
  be given such
that       . Further suppose that      .
Then for any two values 

and 

such that    

  the
sequence of values stored in memory location  during the
evaluation of   


	 is a preﬁx of the sequence of
values stored in  by   


	 (or vice-versa).
Proof: By Lemma 5.5 there exists a conﬁguration  that
simulates both conﬁgurations. Suppose, for the sake of con-
tradiction, that the evaluations disagree on the  update
to the location . We derive a contradiction by induction on
, using Lemma 5.4.  
Note that in order to establish that a given program is se-
cure, not only must the program be well-typed, but all of its
-simulations must be race-free. An easy lemma shows that
if    

 
 and   is race-free then   is race-free. Con-
sequently, it sufﬁces to perform the race-freedom analysis
on the original source program—if the original program is
race-free, all of its simulations are too.
6 Related work
There has been a long history of information-ﬂow research
based on trace models of computer systems [14, 23, 16, 25,
47] and process algebras [34, 39, 35]. Early programming
languages work in this area was initiated by Denning [8] and
Reynolds [31].
A few researchers have investigated noninterference-
based type systems for concurrent languages and process cal-
culi. Smith and Volpano have assumed a ﬁxed number of
threads and a uniform thread scheduler; however, their work
accounts for probabilistic thread scheduling and relaxes the
constraints due to timing channels [43, 44, 41].
McLean [24] and Roscoe [32] proposed determinism-
based deﬁnitions of noninterference for trace-based and
labeled-transition systems. Their approach has not been used
previously in type systems for programming languages.
Focardi and Gorrieri [12] have implemented a ﬂow-
checker for a variant of Milner’s calculus of concurrent sys-
tems (CCS). Honda et al. have proposed a similar system
for the -calculus in which they can faithfully encode Smith
and Volpano’s language [19]. Their work relies on a sophis-
ticated type system that distinguishes between linear chan-
nels, afﬁne channels, and nonlinear channels. Both of these
approaches use bisimulation to prove possibilistic noninter-
ference properties. A similar approach is taken by Abadi
and Gordon to prove the correctness of cryptographic proto-
cols in the Secure Pi Calculus [2], but they do not enforce
information-ﬂow policies.
Hennessy and Riely consider information-ﬂow properties
in the asynchronous-calculus [18]. Like the deﬁnition used
here, their may-testing version of noninterference is timing-
and termination-insensitive, though possibilistic. Their lan-
guage does not support synchronous communication or re-
ﬁnement of the ﬂow analysis via linearity constraints.
Pottier [29] gives an elementary proof of possibilistic
noninterference for a variant of the -calculus, but its type
system is restrictive because it does not make a distinction
between linear and nonlinear channel usage. Conchon [6]
also gives a similar information analysis for the join calcu-
lus, with a strong security condition based on bisimulation.
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Sabelfeld and Sands have considered concurrent lan-
guages in a probabilistic setting [38], achieving scheduler in-
dependence. They use a novel probabilistic bisimulation ap-
proach to specify noninterference properties, and have used
the techniques to prove correct Agat’s program transforma-
tion for eliminating timing channels [3]. However, this trans-
formation does not allow high-  loops or recursive func-
tions, and it allows leaks through instruction-cache effects.
Mantel and Sabelfeld [22] have also considered type systems
for multithreaded secure message-passing languages, includ-
ing the use of Agat’s transformation to pad timing chan-
nels [36] and thus achieve scheduler independence.
The design of   

was inspired by concurrent process
calculi such as the  -calculus [26] and especially the join
calculus [13].
7 Conclusions
This paper makes two contributions: ﬁrst, it presents and
formalizes in a language setting a deﬁnition of information
security based on observational determinism. This deﬁnition
has the advantage over possibilistic security properties that
it is immune to reﬁnement attacks, eliminating covert chan-
nels based on the observation of the probabilities of possible
results. Two insights make the observational determinism
an effective basis for a security condition: internal and ex-
ternal timing channels are treated differently, and programs
are required to be race-free, eliminating their ability to ob-
tain information from the internal timing channels. Based
on these insights, the attacker is formally modeled as having
less power to observe differences between program execu-
tions, with the result that the security deﬁnition avoids some
of the restrictiveness of alternative noninterference deﬁni-
tions. Thus, this work allows a tradeoff in expressiveness
based on an estimation of the power of the attacker.
The second contribution is a demonstration that this new
deﬁnition of security can be enforced by the type system of
a concurrent language with expressive thread communica-
tion primitives in conjunction with a program analysis used
to guarantee race freedom. Factoring the security analy-
sis into a type system and an alias analysis simpliﬁes the
type system and permits more sophisticated analyses to be
plugged in to obtain more precise characterizations of in-
formation ﬂow. The language and its type system support
linear message handlers that can synchronize on messages
from multiple threads; this feature enables a less restrictive
treatment of implicit ﬂows. The  

language is not a full-
featured programming language; nevertheless, it includes the
key features that research on process calculi have shown to
be important for concurrent programming. Therefore, the
security analysis of  

should extend to other concurrent
languages that support message passing. In addition,  

is likely to be useful in designing secure intermediate lan-
guages, just as secure sequential calculi have been [49, 50].
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